

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Sampling Method Used to Count CIA Classification Decisions

LOGGED

FROM

Director of Information Services
1206 Ames Building

EXTENSION

NO. OIS*034*86

27 JAN 1986

DATE

24 JAN 1986

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. EO/DDA
7D18 Hqs

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3. ADDA

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Dick:

An apparent increase in CIA derivative classification decisions triggered a suggestion from D/Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) that we consider a change in the current sampling method used to collect statistics on CIA classification decisions. Our current method is for offices throughout the Agency to take an actual count of all classification decisions for a one week period. We then project that figure for the entire year. It is a laborious and time consuming task for all concerned but it is necessary in order to meet ISOO reporting requirements.

As the D/ISOO suggests, I recommend that we do two samplings this year, but refrain from committing ourselves to future bi-annual samplings. The experience we gain this year should show whether or not bi-annual sampling is worthwhile. The subject of sampling methods often comes up when an Agency reports any significant increase in classification decisions. Two years ago ISOO recommended that the Department of Defense (DoD) consider adopting our sampling method. That year CIA classification figures had held fairly steady while DoD had reported an increase.

Classification statistics are routinely included in ISOO's (over)

FORM 1-79

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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Annual Report to the President. We will probably come in for special mention due to the increase last year. Since ISOO gives the report wide dissemination, the CIA increase could be picked up in the media.

STAT





General
Services
Administration

Information Security
Oversight
Office

Washington, DC 20405

December 11, 1985

Mr. Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Fitzwater:

Executive Order 12356 requires the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) to report annually to the President on the status of the executive branch information security program. The ISOO uses two methods to gather data about the program for this report: (1) the ISOO inspection of each agency's information security program and (2) the statistical report, SF 311, Agency Information Security Program Data, provided to the ISOO by each agency, which contains various data on the program, such as original classification authorities and the number of documents generated within an agency on an original and derivative basis during the fiscal year. The ISOO is concerned about some of the data provided in the Central Intelligence Agency's SF 311 for FY 1985.

A comparison of the Agency's FY 1985 and FY 1984 reports shows a 32 percent decrease in original classification decisions. However, in that category, there was an 85 percent increase in Top Secret, a 22 percent increase in Secret, and a reduction of 86 percent in Confidential actions. Although the overall reduction in original classification decisions is commendable, the increased classification at the higher levels is discouraging.


The report also indicates a tremendous increase in derivative classification decisions; up 1 million overall, or 42 percent. A 94 percent increase was reported for Top Secret classifications. The combined data on original and derivative classification decisions indicate a 34 percent increase in overall decisions and a 93 percent increase in Top Secret classifications.

Before the ISOO submits its FY 1985 report to the President, we believe an explanation for the increases reported above is necessary. Please provide your input to ISOO by December 31, 1985. Please include: (1) Any changes in policy or operations that contributed to the increases; (2) information on the components

2

within the Agency responsible for the changes in statistics; (3) an explanation of specific events contributing to the changes; and (4) the identification of types of information classified in FY 1985 that were not classified in prior years. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please call me on 535-7251, or Harold Mason on 535-7254.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Steven Garfinkel". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

STEVEN GARFINKEL
Director

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DDA/OIS/IRMD/IMB

24 Jan 86)

OIS*034*86

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General
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Office

Washington, DC 20405

DD/A Registry
86-0031X

January 3, 1986

Mr. Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Fitzwater:

Thank you for your letter of December 27, 1985, concerning your information security program. In response to my questions concerning your increase in derivative classification decisions, you stated that some of the increase may be attributable to the method used in collecting the data. The sampling method currently used by the Agency involves taking an actual count of all classification decisions made throughout the Agency during a one week period and projecting that figure for a one year period.

I concur with your statement that the classification decisions made during the week that the sampling is conducted could be high or low, depending on events under way at that time. The discrepancy between last year's CIA count of derivative classification decisions and this year's certainly suggests more than simply program increases. To lessen the possibility of inaccurate statistics based upon a one time sample and to provide more consistent reporting in the Information Security Oversight Office annual report to the President, may I suggest that future statistical reports be based on a one day sampling taken bi-monthly, a two/three day sampling on a semi-annual basis, or some other breakdown of the sampling period that will provide more reliable statistics, without necessarily increasing the number of days during which a count need be conducted.

I would very much appreciate your consideration of a more valid sampling procedure. Thank you for the excellent support you have provided.

Sincerely,

STEVEN GARFINKEL
Director

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

85-4244

27 DEC 1985

Mr. Steven Garfinkel
Director, Information Security
Oversight Office (Z)
General Services Administration
18th and F Streets, N.W.
Washington, DC 20405

Dear Mr. Garfinkel:

Thank you for your letter of 11 December 1985 concerning the information recently submitted by this Agency on its information security program. I was pleased to note in your letter that there has been a significant decline in our FY 85 original classification decisions. This is attributable in part to the vitality of our security education program and the continuing emphasis this Agency places on maintaining the standards established by the President in Executive Order 12356.

In response to the questions raised in your letter, we have reviewed the information security program data for FY 1985 to determine the cause of the increase in derivative classification decisions. We have concluded that the increase in classification decisions does not represent any change in Agency policy or operations but rather the Agency's response to international events that impact on our national security. We have also concluded that the rise in classification decisions was not confined to any one Directorate but was across the board.

To keep the policy makers fully advised on issues and events that affected this nation during the past year, we collected and processed more information. Inevitably, the availability of more information results in more analysis which in turn results in greater demands from our customers. Each step along the way, from the initiation and defining of the

collection requirement, to the development of the means of collection, to the publication of the product, requires classification decisions on the part of various Agency components. Taking these factors into consideration, it is not surprising that the number of classification decisions has risen and that the increase is not confined to any one component of the Agency.

Some of this year's increase in derivative decisions almost certainly is due to the tendency of classifiers to make more use of the Agency's National Security Classification Guide. This is evident in the 32 percent reduction in our original classification decisions. I believe that your inspections have also heightened awareness of the difference between derivative and original classification decisions causing classifiers to make more use of derivative decisions.

Some of the increase may also be attributable to the method used in collecting the data. As you are aware, we use a sampling method to collect this information, taking an actual count of all classification decisions made throughout the Agency during a one week period. We then project that figure for the entire year, assuming that it is representative of the decisions made during an average week. Clearly, the decisions made on classification during that week may be high or low depending on events or programs underway at that time. A sampling taken during a different period could have produced distinctly different results.

I hope this information will be helpful in preparing your report to the President.

Sincerely,

/s/ Harry E. Fitzwater

Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director
for
Administration

STAT DDA/OIS/IRMD/IMB/ (23 December 1985)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

28 JAN 1986

Mr. Steven Garfinkel
Director, Information Security
Oversight Office (Z)
General Services Administration
18th and F Streets, N.W.
Washington, DC 20405

Dear Mr. Garfinkel:

Thank you for your letter of 3 January 1986 concerning the increase in derivative classification decisions reported by this Agency in 1985. Because of this apparent increase, you have suggested that we consider changing the sampling method used by the Agency to collect the statistics.


As we indicated in our letter of 27 December 1985, there are many factors that affect the number of classification decisions made in the Agency during the course of a year. The significant increases in Agency manpower and programs that occurred during 1985 would certainly be reflected in the number of classification decisions rendered, especially derivative decisions.

I am not convinced that the reported increase in our derivative classification decisions is primarily related to the sampling method used to collect the data. Nevertheless, I will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure the accuracy of our reporting and, in this instance, a second sampling might prove worthwhile.

We will, therefore, take two samplings of our classification decisions in 1986. Based on an evaluation of the data from the two samplings, I will determine whether semi-annual samplings are warranted on a continuing basis.

Thank you for your continued support and cooperation.

Sincerely,



Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Administration

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